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NEW MEXICO ANTITRUST LAW 1
JAMES J. WECHSLER*

Recognizing the economic principle that the right of each business
entity to compete freely is the essence of the free enterprise system,
the New Mexico Legislature took a major step to ensure the effectiveness of free competition in New Mexico by passing the Antitrust
Act 2 during the 1979 legislative session. The Act is designed to
modernize the New Mexico Restraint of Trade statutes originally
enacted in 1891 and last amended in 1923. It received overwhelming
approval from the Legislature, passing the House 56 to 0, and the
Senate 31 to 0. This article will update a previous article which
discussed the need for the Antitrust Act and proposed legislative
reform. The most significant provisions of the new law and their
genesis in the Legislature will be discussed.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTITRUST ACT

A complex antitrust bill was introduced in the 1977 legislative
session. The Uniform State Antitrust Act was introduced as a committee substitute, and was defeated on the House floor, because of
resistance from the business community. As a result, Jeff Bingaman,
the Attorney General, set out early in the 1979 session to assure
representatives of the business community of the importance of an
effective antitrust law to the economy of the state. Even prior to
obtaining sponsorship, drafts of the bill were discussed with business
leaders and their attorneys to work out problems of draftsmanship
and substance.3 A draft bill was prepared by the Office of the Attorney General and then presented to Representative George E. Fet*Assistant Attorney General, Director, Antitrust Unit, State of New Mexico; Member of
the Bar, States of New Mexico, Massachusetts and New York; J.D., New York University.
1. This article is an update of a previous article which discussed the importance of
antitrust legislation in New Mexico. Wechsler, New Mexico Restraint of Trade Statutes-A
Legislative Proposal,9 N.M. L. Rev. 1 (1978).
2. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, § § 1 to 18 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ §57-1-1 to 19 (Supp. 1979)).
3. The Office of the Attorney General worked continually with business representatives
throughout the legislative session. The bill enjoyed the general support of business and law
enforcement groups. Representatives of the New Mexico Retail Association, the Association
of Commerce and Industry, the Albuquerque Board of Realtors, and the New Mexico District
Attorneys Association, as well as R. E. Thompson, U.S. Attorney, testified on behalf of the
bill before the House or Senate Judiciary Committee.
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tinger (D. Otero) who decided to be its sponsor. Representatives Paul
Kelly (R. Chaves), Frank L. Horan (D. Bernalillo), Raymond G. Sanchez (D. Bernalillo) and Thomas P. Foy (D. Grant), also agreed to
sponsor the bill. The bill received do-pass votes from the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees, and was managed on the Senate floor
by Senator Joseph H. Mercer (R. Bernalillo).
PROVISIONS OF THE ANTITRUST ACT
In order to attain uniformity in enforcement and interepretation
of the antitrust laws, the Antitrust Act closely paralleled the federal
antitrust laws and the enforcement powers of the United States
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. To accomplish this parallelism the prohibitory language in the Act was adopted from the federal Sherman Act.4 Under both Acts, every contract, agreement,
combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is
unlawful.' Using the wording of the old law,6 the Act further prohibits "every contract, agreement, combination or conspiracy which
controls the quantity, price or exchange of any article of manufacture, product of the soil or mine or any goods or services in restraint
of trade." 7 Similar to Section 2 of the Sherman Act,8 the Act prohibits the monopolizing or attempting to monopolize, or contriving
or conspiring to monopolize trade or commerce in New Mexico.9 To
be subject to the New Mexico law, some part of the affected trade or
commerce must be within the state.1 0 The fact that the activity in
question may affect or involve interstate or foreign commerce does
not preclude action under the Antitrust Act.1 1
ATTORNEY GENERAL POWERS

Civil Remedies
Although the previous restraint of trade statutes granted a remedy
to private litigants, public enforcement was limited to criminal prosecution with a fine of $100 to $1,000, and imprisonment at hard
labor not exceeding one year or until the fine had been paid.1 2 The
4. 15 U.S.C. §§1 to 7 (1976).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-1 (Supp. 1979); 15 U.S.C. §1 (1970).
6. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-1 (1978) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-1 (Supp.
1979).
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-1B (Supp. 1979).
8. 15 U.S.C. §2 (1976).
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-2 (Supp. 1979).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-1A (Supp. 1979).
11. Id.
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-1 (1978) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-6 (Supp.
1979)).

Summer 1979]

NEW MEXICO'S ANTITRUSTLA W

inadequacy of this remedy was a major factor in the lack of public
enforcement of the antitrust laws. One of the primary purposes in
introducing the legislation expanding the powers of the Attorney
General was to develop an effective antitrust enforcement capability
within New Mexico comparable to that of the United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division and of several other states. Consequently, the bill, as presented to its sponsors, included provisions
empowering the Attorney General' 3 to seek injunctive relief,' civil
penalties,1 I and damages in civil actions.' 6 Further, a specific subsection was included permitting the Attorney General to bring an
action for damages or injunctive relief on behalf of a political subdivision or public agency, as well as on behalf of the state.' '
These provisions of the proposed bill met with little modification
throughout the legislative process. Upon the request of Representative
Paul Kelly, Jr., the civil penalties, which were originally written in
conformity with the Uniform State Antitrust Act to be a maximum
of $50,000 for a violation, were increased to a maximum of
$250,000 for business entities other than individuals. 1 8 When the
bill was presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator W. S.
Eoff (R. McKinley) objected to the maximum penalty as potentially
too damaging to small businessmen, and he alone voted against passage.
Civil Investigative Demand
The most significant procedural amendment effected by the Antitrust Act is the granting of pre-complaint investigatory powers to the
Attorney General. As originally proposed, the Attorney General
would have had the same authority as the United States Department
of Justice, Antitrust Division, to issue a civil investigatory demand
(CID) requiring a person or entity to produce documents for inspection or answer questions under oath.' I Safeguards such as confidentiality,2 ° description of the nature of the conduct under investiga13. The Attorney General has primary enforcement under the Act. He may delegate this
authority on a case-by-case basis to a district attorney. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-10 (Supp.
1979).
14. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, § §5, 9
(codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3A (Supp. 1979)).
15. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §8 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-7 (Supp. 1979)).
16. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §5 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3 (Supp. 1979)).
17. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §6 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-3B (Supp. 1979)).
18. N.M. Laws, ch. 374, § 8 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-7 (Supp. 1979)).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1970) (as amended by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976).
20. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §6 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-5C (Supp. 1979)).
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tion, 2 ' and right to counsel2 2 were included in the draft. On the
proposal of Representative George Fettinger, additional protection
was added to require judicial intervention prior to the issuance of a
demand. Under the Act as passed, the Attorney General cannot, as
the Department of Justice can, issue a CID without first applying to
the district court for approval of the issuance of the CID. The Attorney General must apply to the District Court of Santa Fe County
which shall approve the demand upon a finding that the Attorney
General has reasonable cause to believe that the person upon whom
it will be served has relevant information to the investigation and
that the demand is proper in form.2 3 Representative Fettinger further proposed that the recipient of a CID not be required to contest
the CID in Santa Fe County if he resides or maintains a principal
place of business in another county within the state. As a result, if
the Attorney General wishes to enforce a CID, he must file a petition
in the district court of the county of residence or principal place of
business of the recipient, or in the district court of the County of
Santa Fe, if the recipient does not reside or maintain a principal
place of residence in New Mexico. 2 4 The provision for pre-complaint
investigations was not altered once the bill was introduced and was
not opposed by business and industry lobbyists.
Criminal Sanctions
The previous law limited the Attorney General to a misdemeanor
prosecution with a penalty of a fine not exceeding $1,000 nor less
than $100, and by imprisonment at hard labor not exceeding one
year or until the fine has been paid. 2" Violations of the federal
antitrust laws are felonies, subjecting violators to a maximum jail
term of three years and a $100,000 fine for individuals and a
$1,000,000 fine for corporations .2 6 For that reason, the draft presented to the sponsors changed the criminal penalty to that of a
fourth degree felony, with the statutory penalty of imprisonment for
an individual for a term of not less than one year nor more than five
years, and a fine not to exceed $5,000.2 7 Prior to introduction of
21. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §6 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-SA (Supp. 1979)).
22. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §6 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-5D (Supp. 1979)).
23. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-5B (Supp. 1979).
24. Id.
25. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-1 (1978) (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-6A (Supp.
1979)).
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
27. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-3D (1978).
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the bill, however, the proposed fine for violators other than individuals was raised to a maximum of $250,000. Further modifications
which eliminated reference in the Act to the Criminal Code 2 8 and
increased the fine for individuals to a maximum of $50,00029 were
made in the Senate Judiciary Committee.
Protection Against Duplicative Prosecutions
In order to obviate the possibility of abusive prosecutions under
the Act, efforts were made by the Attorney General to develop
protections against duplicative penalties for the same violation. One
such provision the Attorney General proposed was a requirement
that he would elect whether to pursue either a criminal or civil
penalty. The issue was presented in the Senate Judiciary Committee
as to the stage of litigation at which this election would have to be
made. The bill originally provided that the election to forego criminal prosecution was made by the filing of a civil complaint, and the
filing of an information or the returning of an indictment in a criminal proceeding precluded the filing of a civil action to assess a civil
penalty. An amendment introduced by Senator Joe Lang (D. Bernalillo) in the Committee, however, provided additional flexibility to
the Attorney General in making the election. As a result of the
amendment, the election by the Attorney General to pursue only a
civil penalty is made upon the obtaining of a judgment in the action
to assess a civil penalty. 3 0 Consequently, the Attorney General may
pursue discovery in the civil proceedings, and, if the information
received indicates that the conduct involved should more properly be
prosecuted as a criminal violation, he may, at that time, seek the
criminal sanction.
The concurrent state and federal jurisdiction of some violations
gave rise to another provision which also gives protection against
duplicative prosecution. If a person has been convicted in a criminal
proceeding for violation of the federal antitrust laws, further prosecution by the state would be unnecessary. As a result, after such a
28. Reference to the Criminal Code for sentencing was eliminated by the Senate Judiciary Committee to remedy any possibility that the section may be in violation of Article
IV, Section 18 of the New Mexico Constitution which prohibits legislation by reference to
other legislation.
29. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, § 7 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-6A
(Supp. 1979)).
30. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §10 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-9
(Supp. 1979)). The election of remedies provision only affects the ability of the state to
seek to assess a civil penalty in a civil action. It does not affect the right of the state to seek
damages. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-14 (Supp. 1979) which specifically provides that the
remedies afforded the state are cumulative.
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conviction, the state is precluded from either bringing a civil action to
assess a penalty or instituting its own criminal proceeding for the
same violation. 3 '
PRIVATE REMEDIES
The previous antitrust law enabled an injured party to recover
damages caused by the antitrust violation, declared all contracts and
agreements which constituted violations to be void, and relieved the
purchaser of a commodity purchased from a violator from making
payment for the commodity. The Antitrust Act adopted the first
two of these remedies. The third was rejected in drafting in view of
the possibility that it could have been invoked to avoid payment on a
contract for reasons unrelated to antitrust violations.3 2
In keeping with the purpose of conforming the Act with the federal antitrust laws, the provision creating a damage remedy utilized
the language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act 3 3 and granted standing
to a person "injured in his business or property."' 3 Two significant
deviations from the present law, however, were adopted by the New
Mexico Legislature. The first departure involved the amount of damages available to successful litigants. The Clayton Act grants mandatory treble damages. 3
Such potential relief acts as a deterrent to
anticompetitive activity.3 6 After discussions with business representatives who were opposed to such relief in the state law, the
Office of the Attorney General drafted a modified version of the
Uniform State Antitrust Act provision. 3 7 The draft would have permitted treble damages if the trier of fact found the violation to be
flagrant, as under the Uniform Act. It further provided that per se
violations would be presumed to be flagrant unless affirmatively
found to the contrary. Although the "flagrant" standard had been
upheld by the Arizona Supreme Court, 3 " Representative Fettinger
31. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §§7, 8 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§57-1-6B-7C (Supp. 1979)).
32. See Kelly v. Kosuga, 358 U.S. 516 (1959) and State ex rel. McGraw-Edison Co. v.
Elec. City Supply Co., 74 N.M. 285, 393 P.2d 21 (1964), in which allegations of antitrust
violations were insufficient to invalidate contracts which were collateral to the alleged
violations.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
34. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3 (Supp. 1979). The provision specifically includes nonbusiness purchases and injuries within the ambit of actionable "business or property." This
provision illustrates the legislative intent to grant standing for injuries by consumers which is
consistent with the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 99 S.Ct. 2326 (1979) decided after the passage of the Antitrust Act.
35. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976).
36. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
37. [19741 4 Trade Reg. Rep. CCH 30,101, §8(b).
38. Western Waste Serv. Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 120 Ariz. 90, 584 P.2d 554 (1978).
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suggested eliminating such a standard in view of its potential vagueness if challenged in New Mexico courts. As enacted, the statute
incorporates the treble damages concept of the Clayton Act but
grants discretion to the trier of fact. It provides that up to treble
damages may be requested, but the trier of fact may award less than
the amount requested, but no less than actual damages, if the facts so
justify.' 9
The second deviation from the present interpretation of federal
law is more pronounced and substantially affects the right of those
injured by antitrust violations to recover damages. The United States
Supreme Court, in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,4 0 held, with limited
exceptions, that those who do not purchase directly from antitrust
violators are unable to recover damages for such violations under the
federal antitrust laws. To specifically permit recovery by injured indirect purchasers under the Antitrust Act, the New Mexico Legislature provided that a person injured in his business or property "directly or indirectly" has standing to bring an action under the Act.4 1
The granting of standing to indirect purchasers was the most controversial aspect of the bill during its early stages. Business lobbyists,
some connected with national organizations which were fighting bills
in Congress aimed at overturning the Illinois Brick decision, originally objected to the provision. The objection was based primarily
upon the fear that permitting recovery by indirect purchasers would
give rise to the possibility of duplicative recovery by indirect and
direct purchasers. As a result, a provision was drafted to grant a
defendant as a complete or partial defense to a damage claim, the
right to prove that the plaintiff passed on all or some of the amounts
the plaintiff was overcharged or undercharged to another purchaser
or seller. 4 2 This provision eliminated the possibility of duplicative
liability. Such a "pass-on" defense is not presently permitted in a
federal action. 4"
Additional correlation of the Antitrust Act with the federal antitrust laws can be found in the provision regarding proof in a private
39. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §5 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3
(Supp. 1979)).
40. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
41. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §5 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3
(Supp. 1979)).
42. Such provision was enacted in Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §5 (codified
at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-3C (Supp. 1979)).
43. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968). The decision
in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), was based upon the need to avoid
duplicative recovery by direct and indirect purchasers from defendants who could not assert
a "pass-on" defense. The Antitrust Act differs from the present federal law and permits
both the recovery and the defense. Legislation is pending in the 96th Congress to accomplish similar results. S.300 and H.R. 2060.
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action. The Act encourages private litigation as an enforcement tool
by facilitating proof in a private action following a civil or criminal
proceeding brought by the state in which a final judgment or decree
is entered determining that a person has violated the Act. As under
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 4 4 the judgment or decree is prima
facie evidence against the violator in any other action brought against
him under the Act for all matters with respect to which the judgment
or decree would be an estoppel between the two parties. 4
Specifically unaffected by this provision, however, is the application of
collateral estoppel or issue preclusion. 4 6
OTHER PROVISIONS
Statute of Limitations
In adopting a limitations period during which an action under the
Act must be brought, the Legislature took into account the difficulty
in discovering facts concerning antitrust violations in view of the
nature of the conspiracy involved, and in view of the continuing
nature of antitrust violations. Generally, an action must be brought
within four years from the time it accrues. 4 A plaintiff is permitted,
however, to bring an action within four years after he discovered, or
by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the
facts relied upon to prove the claim alleged. 4 Antitrust violations
such as price-fixing, refusals to deal, or tying arrangements, or their
effects, may continue over an extended period of time. Under the
Antitrust Act a cause of action for a continuing violation is deemed
to accrue at any time during the period of the violation. 4 In order
to encourage private enforcement comparable to the federal laws' 0
44. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
45. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, § 12 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-1-11
(Supp. 1979)). For the purposes of this provision, a final judgment or decree does not
include a consent judgment, a decree entered before any testimony has been taken at trial in
a civil proceeding, or a judgment based upon a plea of nolo contendere in a criminal
proceeding.
46. Id. The Clayton Act does not contain a provision specifically preserving the doctrine
of collateral estoppel. The Seventh Circuit has recently held that Section 5 (a) of the Clayton
Act preempts the usage of collateral estoppel. Illinois v. General Paving Company, 590 F.2d
680 (7th Cir. 1979). Under the Antitrust Act, it is clear that a plaintiff is able to use the
doctrine of collateral estoppel to avoid re-litigation of defendant's liability in appropriate
cases.

47. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, § 13 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-12
(Supp. 1979)).
48. Id. This provision was added to the bill by amendment in the House Judiciary
Committee.
49. Id This provision was added to the bill by amendment in the House Judiciary
Committee.
50. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1976).
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the Act allows damage actions to be brought within one year after
the conclusion of a timely action brought by the state for criminal or
civil penalties or injunctive relief.' 1
Exemptions
The 1923 amendment to the previous law- 2 created exemptions
from the New Mexico antitrust laws similar to those contained in
Section 6 of the Clayton Act." Under these exemptions, certain
activities of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations instituted for the purposes of mutual help are not prohibited, and the
labor of a human being is excluded as a commodity or article of
commerce.5 4 These exemptions were left intact by the Legislature.
The Antitrust Act added an exemption for activities or arrangements expressly approved by any federal or New Mexico regulatory
body or officer acting in a manner permitted by statutory authority.5 " The state would generally be precluded from reaching federally regulated activities under the preemption doctrine. As to state
regulation, however, the Act arguably establishes a broader exemption than is presently available under the federal laws as a result of the
judicially created "state action doctrine" originally adopted by the
United States Supreme Court in Parker v. Brown. I6 Although the
scope of the state action exemption is currently uncertain due to
divided opinions by the Supreme Court,5 I it is evident that a strict
standard of scrutiny is applied if the conduct of private persons
performed pursuant to state authority is to fall within the exemption. In applying Parker v. Brown, one standard set forth by the
Supreme Court requires the private activity be compelled by the
state acting as a sovereign.5 " In a later plurality opinion, however,
the Parker doctrine was read as exempting only the actions of public
officials and not the private conduct performed pursuant to state
51. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §13 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann.
§57-1-12B (Supp. 1979)).
52. 1923 N.M. Laws, ch. 37, §1 (current version at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-4 (1978)).
53. 15 U.S.C. §17 (1976).
54. N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-4 (1978).
55. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §17 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-16
(Supp. 1979)). This provision was originally proposed by insurance companies whose rates
are regulated by the Department of Insurance. It was added to the bill in the Senate
Judiciary Committee. An amendment proposed to the Senate Judiciary Committee at the
request of the newspaper lobby would have exempted from the Act any activity exempted
under the federal antitrust laws. This amendment was defeated in committee as unconstitutional legislation by reference in violation of N.M. Const. art. 4, § 18.
56. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
57. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); Cantor v.
Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
58. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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approval.5 9 As a result of the difference in the newly adopted New
Mexico law and the judicial interpretations of the federal state action
exemption, although certain state regulated activity may be exempt
under New Mexico law, it may nevertheless be reached in a federal
antitrust action.
Construction With FederalAntitrust Laws
As expressed by Representative Fettinger in his testimony before
the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, the purpose of the
legislation was to develop an antitrust law in New Mexico which,
with certain limited expressed exceptions, would be comparable to
the federal antitrust laws. As the statutory provisions of antitrust
laws do not specifically set forth in detail the prohibited activity and
other elements of the law, it has been necessary for the federal courts
to develop a substantial body of antitrust law in interpreting the
federal laws. To the extent that the federal laws are comparable to
the Antitrust Act, the legislature has indicated its intent to achieve
uniform application of the two sets of laws. In doing so, it has
specifically stated that, unless the Act has provisions to the contrary,
it shall be construed by New Mexico courts in harmony with the
judicial interpretations of the federal laws.6 0 Thus, long-developed
doctrines such as the "rule of reason" under which only unreasonable restraints of trade are illegal, 6 1 and the per se rule under which
certain types of violations, because of their pernicious nature, are
illegal regardless of their purpose or harm, 6 2 will be construed to be
part of the New Mexico law.
CONCLUSION
The legislative mandate incorporated in the Antitrust Act indicates
the importance of the preservation of the principles of competition
to the economy of the state. Enforcement efforts, both public and
private, will encourage a free marketplace for business and consumers. The Antitrust Act provides an effective tool toward ensuring
freedom and efficiency in business operations and the most competitive prices for goods and services.
59. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (plurality opinion of Justices
Stevens, Brennan, White and Marshall).
60. Antitrust Act, 1979 N.M. Laws, ch. 374, §16 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-1-15
(Supp. 1979)). An earlier version of the bill also made reference to the federal antitrust laws
in the construction of the Act. This language was removed by the Senate Judiciary Committee in view of possible conflict with N.M. Const. art. 4 § 18 as legislation by reference.
61. The "rule of reason" doctrine was originally adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
62. The concept of the per se rule in decisions of the United States Supreme Court
originated inAddyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).

